Corporate Governance: 企業統治における米国と日本の違い

Corporateg Governanceのリーディングの宿題は、International Corporate Governanceについて。アメリカ以外の国における企業統治の姿を研究したペーパーなのだが、何せ60ページ以上もあって、他の宿題等に追われていた自分としては、かいつまんで読むことにした。

Kaplan (1994) studies executive compensation in the US and Japan. He concludes that top executive compensation in both countries is related to stock returns and to earnings losses. The magnitude of that relation is quite similar in the two countries, though Kaplan points out that US managers own more stock and stock options than do Japanese managers.

アメリカの経営者の方が日本よりも株・ストックオプションを多く持つ傾向がある。

In particular, they concentrate on the appointment of outside directors to Japanese boards, where outside directors are defined as individuals previously employed by banks or other nonfinancial corporations. They find that such appointments increase following poor stock performance and earnings losses, and that they are more likely in firms with significant bank borrowings, concentrated shareholders, and membership in a corporate group. As evidence that such outside directors are effective corporate governance mechanisms, Kaplan and Minton show that, on average, such appointments stabilize and modestly improve corporate performance, measured using stock returns, operating performance, and sales growth.

社外取締役の招聘は株価・利益の不振が続くと増加する。特に、そういう会社は多くの銀行からの負債を抱えていたり、大株主がいたり、系列会社の一員だったりすることが多い。研究によると、社外取締役は業績回復と安定化に一定の成果をあげているらしい。

Kang and Shivdasani (1995) find that Japanese firms with blockholders restructure more quickly following performance declines than do Japanese firms without blockholders.

Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) find that the relation between bank ownership and firm performance in Japan varies over the ownership spectrum; in particular, the relation is more positive when ownership is high.

Individualな投資家がたくさん投資していてOwnershipが比較的分散しているアメリカに比べ、日本は大株主がOwnershipを塊で持っていることが多い。そういった大株主が多い企業では、パフォーマンス低下に対するリストラクチュアリングが速い。

また、銀行のOwnership度合いが高いほど、パフォーマンスがよくなる傾向がある。

It is also common in many countries that major shareholders’ control rights exceed their cash flow rights. The realities of ownership and control are such that the primary agency conflict in the US – that between professional managers and their widely dispersed shareholders – is relatively unimportant in many other countries. In its place, however, there is a different agency conflict, that between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Evidence suggests that the private benefits of control of companies can be significant and that they are value-reducing.

アメリカでは、経営者と分散した株主の間のAgency Conflict（株主の代理者としての経営者の利害と株主の利害が100%一致しないことから起こる諸問題）があるが、他の国では、コントロール権を握っている大株主とマイノリティ株主の間で別のコンフリクトがある。そして、そういったコントロールによるベネフィットはインパクトが大きく、企業価値を下げる方向にある。